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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5138
In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse in 
September 2008, drop in the supply of trade finance, a 
critical engine for trade transactions, has become an acute 
concern for the development community. Banks were 
increasing pricing on trade finance transactions to cover 
increased funding costs and higher credit risks, and trade 
was dropping drastically in most countries, with global 
trade projected to decline in 2009 for the first time in 
decades. Yet, little was known about the real impact of 
the crisis on developing country’s capacity to export. The 
World Bank has commissioned a firm and bank survey 
on trade and trade finance developments in developing 
countries during the first quarter of 2009 to collect field 
information. In total, 425 firms and 78 banks were 
surveyed in 14 developing countries across five regions. 
This paper—a product of the International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to better understand the role of trade finance in the current global economic crisis. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at mmalouche@worldbank.org.  
This paper summarizes the findings of the survey as 
well as discusses the type of policies governments and 
international organizations put in place to mitigate 
the impact of the crisis. In sum, the survey findings 
confirmed that the global financial crisis has constrained 
trade finance for exporters and importers in developing 
countries. But the impact varied by the firm size, sectoral 
activity, and countries’ integration into the global 
economy. In particular, SMEs were particularly affected, 
and export diversification was made more difficult, 
especially in low income countries. Nevertheless, drop in 
demand has emerged as the top concern of firms at the 
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Executive Summary 
In the aftermath of the Lehmans Brothers collapse in September 2008, Pascal Lamy, 
Director General of the World Trade Organization, warned the international development 
community about the drop in the supply of trade finance, critical engine for trade 
transactions. These warning were supported by the increase in spreads, the spilling over of 
the financial crisis among both developed and developing countries, and by anecdotal 
stories reported by the press about developing country exporters constrained by trade 
finance. As of December 2008, trade finance deals were offered at 300-400 basis points 
over interbank refinance rates—two to three times more than the rate a year earlier.  The 
cost of Letters of Credits was doubling or tripling for buyers in many countries, including 
China, Turkey, Pakistan, Argentina, and Bangladesh.  At the same time, trade was 
dropping drastically in most countries in the Fall 2008. Exports and imports of forty-five 
countries that had reported trade data for January 2009 were uniformly weak, with an 
average drop of over 30 percent as compared to January 2008.  Global trade of 
merchandise and services was projected to decline in 2009 for the first time in decades.  
Yet, little was known about the magnitude of any potential shortage or ‘gap’ in trade 
finance, whether it was mainly demand or supply driven, the real impact on developing 
country exports, and the type of policies governments and international organizations 
should put in place to mitigate the impact. One of the reasons was the lack of data in this 
field. Banks rarely report trade credits volumes, and corporate lending is not globally 
collected.  Selected data used to proxy trade finance trends indicated that trade finance 
flows was dropping. According to Dealogic,
1 global trade finance contracted by about 40 
percent in the last quarter of 2008 as compared to 2007. Data from the Society for 
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) on short-term trade finance 
messages sent between banks for letters of credits, guarantees and documentary 
collections showed a decline of 3.5 percent in October 2008 as compared to the same 
period in 2007.  These early alarming signs were corroborated by historical evidence that 
trade finance tends to be highly vulnerable in times of crisis, as it was the case in East 
Asia in the late 1990s.  
A critical question to the development community was to capture the impact of the crisis 
on developing countries in terms of availability of trade finance to their exporters and 
importers and the impact on trade flows. Several organizations have joined efforts to 
collect field data. The IMF-BAFT launched a survey of about 40 banks in developed and 
emerging markets in October and November 2008
2. Their results indicated that there has 
been a widespread increase in pricing of all trade finance instruments relative to banks' 
costs of funds, but the quantity changes have been mixed. They also estimated that banks’ 
trade finance capacity constraints impact about 6-10 percent of developing country trade, 
implying a trade finance gap in the order of $100-300 billion.  
 
 The World Bank has sought to complement these efforts by conducting in March/April 
2009 a firm and bank survey on trade and trade finance developments in developing 
countries since the beginning of the financial crisis.  In total, 425 firms and 78 banks were 
                                                 
1 Dealogic is a leading provider of global investment banking analysis and systems and one of the few sources of 
information on trade finance developments. 
2 IMF- BAFT - A Survey among Banks Assessing the Current Trade Finance Environment- August 2009, Mimeo. 6 
 
surveyed in 14 developing countries across five regions
3.  In sum, the survey findings 
confirmed that the global financial crisis has constrained trade finance for exporters and 
importers in developing countries. Yet, drop in demand has emerged as the top concern of 
firms. The lack of export revenues was putting pressure on firms’ cash flow and, therefore, 
their capacity to fund their export and import transactions. The survey revealed some 
stylized facts at the firm, bank, and income levels. 
 
At the firm level, firms that rely to a large extent on the banking system for trade finance 
have suffered from more risk averse and selective local banks. On the contrary, firms that 
mostly rely on inter-firm financing and self-financing have been mostly affected by the 
slowing global economy, the lack and cancellation of orders, delays in buyers’ payments, 
and shorter maturity imposed by suppliers. SMEs have been more affected than large 
firms because of a weaker capital base and bargaining power vis-à-vis global buyers as 
well banks. Also, SMEs have been more subject to high increases in the cost of trade 
finance instruments. A large number of SMEs operating in global supply-chains and/or in 
sectors that have been most affected by the slow global economy such as in the auto 
industry have reported as being constrained both through the banking system and the drop 
in export revenues and buyers’ liquidity. Moreover, firms indicated being constrained by 
the need to provide more guarantees and insurance in times of crisis mainly due to lack of 
affordable supply of these products. 
At the regional level, the three low-income African countries where our survey was 
conducted (Ghana, Kenya, and Sierra Leone), seem to have been relatively more insulated 
by the financial crisis as of March-April 2009. Their primary trade finance constraints 
originate from more structural problems such as poorly developed banking system and 
trade finance institutions, and macroeconomic imbalances. Many of these exporters have 
traditionally relied on self-financing and cash-in-advance; therefore, they have also been 
affected by the drop in commodity prices and global demand from their main export 
market (US and the EU). The drop in their cash reserves has further constrained their trade 
finance. The financial crisis has also added strains on the domestic financial systems and 
is unfavorable to SMEs and new firms that are seeking to diversify away from commodity 
exports. In South Africa, as in other middle-income countries in the other regions, trade 
finance constraints did not seem to have a regional dimension, but rather dependent on the 
nature of the business relationship with clients and industry. 
At the bank level, the drastic reduction in global financial liquidity and in the number of 
intermediary players has pushed banks in developing countries to become more cautious, 
risk averse and selective, tightening trade finance conditions. Interviews with banks 
confirmed the increase in pricing and drop in volume of trade credit. Yet, the drop in 
volume seems to reflect lack of demand due to the global recession rather than a 
consequence of the increase in pricing. Moreover, lack of liquidity in local currency did 
not appear to be an issue. 
 
In terms of governments’ response, the survey revealed that most governments have taken 
actions to mitigate the impact of the financial crisis mainly through two channels: (i) Most 
                                                 
3 The 14 countries are: Indonesia and the Philippines in East Asia; Turkey and Ukraine in Europe and Central Asia; 
Brazil, Chile and Peru in Latin America, Egypt and Tunisia in Middle East and North Africa, India in South Asia; and 
Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and South Africa in Sub Saharan Africa. 7 
 
governments sought to make available more liquidity in the financial system to alleviate 
pressure on domestic banks, or to secure trade credit lines to trading firms. In this 
perspective, government bodies such as publicly-owned Export Credit Agencies and/or 
Export Import Banks were instrumental. While it is still too early to assess the 
effectiveness of these measures, early reactions collected by the surveyors from exporters, 
importers, and bank indicate that either the additional liquidity has not yet translated into 
more lending by banks, or being not enough to compensate for the international credit 
lines; and (ii) Some governments put in place broad measures that aimed to support 




In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, Pascal Lamy, 
Director General of the World Trade Organization, warned the international development 
community about the drop in the supply of trade finance, a critical engine for trade 
transactions. These warnings were supported by the increase in spreads, the spilling of the 
financial crisis among both developed and developing countries, and by anecdotal stories 
reported by the press about developing country exporters constrained by trade finance. 
Tight credit conditions were driving up spreads for trade credits in many countries, 
especially in emerging markets. Banks were increasing pricing on all trade finance 
transactions to cover increased funding costs and higher credit risks. At the same time, 
trade was dropping drastically in most countries, and global trade was projected to decline 
in 2009 for the first time in decades.  
Yet, little was known about the magnitude of any potential shortage or ‘gap’ in trade 
finance, whether it was mainly demand or supply driven, the real impact on developing 
country exports, and the type of policies governments and international organizations 
should put in place to mitigate the impact. To improve information on the impact of the 
crisis on developing countries, the World Bank has conducted a firm and bank survey on 
trade and trade finance developments in developing countries during the first quarter of 
2009.  In total, 425 firms and 78 banks were surveyed in 14 developing countries across 
five regions.
4 (See Annex 1 for more information on the sample).   
 
The objective of the surveys was to collect field information on how exporters, importers, 
and banks in developing countries are being affected by the crisis. The analysis has proved 
to be very insightful, in particular in terms of who is being the most affected and why, as 
well as what are some of the long term constraints that policy makers should address to 
better support firms. 
5  In addition to the firm and bank surveys, the surveyors collected 
information on governments’ policy actions put in place to mitigate the impact of financial 
crisis and global recession on trade finance and trade flows.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I reports on trade 
developments globally and in the countries where the survey was conducted. Section II 
highlights some key findings from the survey at the firm level. Section III focuses on 
results from the bank surveys. Section IV reports on the governments’ actions to support 
trade and trade finance. 
I.  Trade developments since September 2008 
 
According to the World Bank projections as of June 2009, the global economy will 
contract at an annualized rate of 3 percent and trade in goods and services will shrink by 
                                                 
4 The 14 countries are: Indonesia and the Philippines in East Asia; Turkey and Ukraine in Europe and Central Asia; 
Brazil, Chile and Peru in Latin America, Egypt and Tunisia in the Middle East and North Africa, India in South Asia; 
and Ghana, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and South Africa in Sub Saharan Africa. 
5 However, the surveys do not to allow for a comprehensive and robust analysis of the firms’ constraints, and therefore, 
interpretation of the results should be cautious, including when drawing some generalization and policy 
recommendations. 9 
 
9.7 percent in 2009 in an unprecedented synchronized way. A rebound is projected for 
2010. The slowdown is relatively uniform across all regions suggesting that the drop in 
demand is the primary cause. While the global downturn started in developed economies, 
developing countries were also being affected. The Latin America region is projected to 
post the severest decline in trade in 2009, while the rebound will be driven by East and 
South Asia. These projections are in line with a review of the impact of historical global 
downturns on trade flows by Freund (2009) indicating that the elasticity of global trade 
volumes to real world GDP has increased gradually from around 2 in the 1960s to above 3 
nowadays. This is a result of the increased vertical specialization that characterizes trade 
and the large proportion of trade occurring within global value chains. According to Yi 
(2009), the consequence of the global integration is that each $1 of exports contains more 
imports than previously, so that a decline in GDP has a magnified effect on world trade. 
The positive side is that trade tends to rebound very rapidly when the outlook brightens.  
Trade in services is proving to be more resilient. Monthly U.S. trade in goods declined by 
33 percent in value terms between July 2008 and February 2009; trade in services declined 
by only 10 percent during the same period. This trend is also observed for other developed 
countries and developing countries. The resilience of services trade is mostly a reflection 
of relatively robust demand for business-related professional services (e.g., insurance, 
telecommunications) and technical services (e.g., legal and IT outsourcing). The value of 
trade in services such as transportation of goods and people and tourism has fallen in line 
with the merchandise average, but business process outsourcing is still registering positive 
growth rates (albeit much lower than pre-crisis). It also reflects the fact that the demand 
for services is less cyclical than demand for goods and not subjected to the decline in 





Among the surveyed countries, the World Bank estimates that the Philippines, Ukraine 
and Turkey would be the most affected, while low-income countries in Africa, mostly 
commodity exporters, would be more resilient and post positive export growth in 2009 
(Figure 1). Monthly data available up to March 2009 for nine out of the 14 surveyed 
countries confirm that trade plunged starting in the last quarter of 2008 and continued to 
decrease in the first months of 2009 (Figure 2). Interestingly, the drop in trade in most of 
these countries has been driven by a sharp decline in exports as demand from developed 
countries dried up abruptly in the last quarter of 2008. Also, in commodity exporter 
countries, exports and imports tend to be less synchronized as imports traditionally include 
consumer and intermediate goods and inputs for the domestic economy, and for which the 
local demand has not been affected in the early phase of the financial crisis. However, 
exports have been affected by the recession in developed countries. As a result, exports 
dropped by 10 percent on average across these nine countries, while imports increased by 
7 percent on average, during the last quarter of 2008. As a result, some countries have 
reported an alarming squeeze in their current account and foreign exchange reserves that 
was constraining their trade finance capacity.  
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Figure 1: World Bank export volume projections for surveyed countries, 2009 (%) 
 
Source: World Bank Development Economic Prospects 
 






While most countries have been severely affected, the impact of the decline has been 
relatively severe in countries that are integrated and dependent on trade with developed 
countries, where demand has sharply contracted. In our sample, those countries include 
Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Tunisia and Turkey.  The increased 
fragmentation of the production that took place in the last two decades has led to the 
increase in the elasticity of global trade volumes to real world GDP from around 2 in the 
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as output declined but also translates to a more rapid recovery as the recession ends 
(Freund 2009)
6.  
Trade in certain sectors and products have been more affected than others. Exports of 
durable goods have been most affected. Specifically, disaggregated monthly data for the 
U.S. and Japan show that some industries are harder hit such as mineral products, 
transportation equipment, metals, and stone and glass, while others such as have seen an 
increase in trade. In Brazil, most sectors faced export revenue reductions in January 2009, 
but the automotive sector has been particularly hit. Exports from lean retailing industries 
such as Textile and Clothing were also affected, in particular in countries where this sector 
represents a large part of export revenues such as in Indonesia, Tunisia, and Turkey. Trade 
of non-durable consumer goods such as cell phones, food and tobacco products have 
declined least, as demand for these products is less likely to be put off as long.  
Commodity exporters such as Sierra Leone, Kenya and Peru have mainly suffered from 
the drop in commodity prices. A number of commodity prices from agricultural products 
to minerals and energy have abruptly dropped in the second half of 2008, after reaching a 
peak in previous months. In Sierra Leone, diamond and rutile exports (79 percent of 
exports) reduced by 50 percent and 20 percent respectively. For Peru, commodity exports 
(minerals, fish oil/meal and coffee) dropped 20 percent in the last quarter of 2008 
compared to the same period in 2007.  Ghanaian exports have remained strong with the 
price of its traditional exports such as Cocoa, Gold and Timber continued to increase. 
Exports of services have generally proven to be more resilient (Mattoo and Brochert 
2009). The resilience of services trade is mostly a reflection of relatively robust demand 
for business-related professional (e.g., insurance, telecommunications) and technical 
services (e.g., legal and IT outsourcing). The value of trade in services such as 
transportation of goods and people and tourism has fallen in line with the merchandise 
average, but business process outsourcing is still registering positive growth rates (albeit 





Two-thirds of the respondents declared that their exports dropped sharply between 
September 2008 and March 2009, in particular firms in India, Indonesia, Peru, Tunisia, 
and Turkey (Figure 3). The picture is more balance in the other countries where about the 
same number of firms have experienced either a drop or an increase in their exports. 
Similarly, 71 percent of respondents have reported a decrease in their imports since 
September 2008. This spans firms from different size and sectors.  The survey indicates 
that large firms have reported a decline in their imports to a larger extent than to SMEs, 
most likely reflecting their capacity to cut on imports and rely on larger inventories in 
times of gloomy economical prospects. On the contrary, SMEs seem to have been more 
affected than large firms with regard to exports as they tend to rely on fewer clients and 
                                                 
6 Freund Caroline, 2009, “The trade response to global downturns: historical evidence”, Policy Research Working 
Paper 5015, World Bank 
7 In Egypt, services exports dropped due mainly to a drop in Suez Canal receipts and a contraction in tourism revenues, 
affected by the decline in the number of tourist nights on the back of the worsening global economic conditions. 12 
 
markets, often integrated with buyers in rich countries, and therefore more sensitive to 
demand.   
A majority of firms declared that lack of new orders and/or cancelled orders explained the 
drop in their exports, indifferently from the size of the firm (Figure 4). Firms in Tunisia 
and Turkey particularly emphasized the effect of a slower economy in the EU, their main 
export market. This has translated into less orders but also lack of finance offered by 
buyers.  Indeed, a large number of firms from the above two countries as well as the 
Philippines have reported lack of finance, mainly from the buyer, to constrain their 
exports. This illustrates the case of firms for which trade finance constraints are not 
directly related to lack of financing from the banking system since they traditionally rely 
on self-financing and/or financing from the buyers.  They are affected by a weaker global 
demand and uncertainty on future prospects. These firms will likely recover more quickly 
as the economy picks up even if the banking system is not yet fully rehabilitated. 
 
Figure 3: Most firms reported a drop in their exports and imports between 
September 2008 and March 2009  
































Despite the abrupt drop in exports, 55 percent of firms have not changed and did not 
foresee changes to their destination for exports or origin of imports. Main reasons for not 
changing export destination or import origin for most firms are threefold: (i) Firms are still 
assessing the impact of the financial crisis; (ii) Companies still rely on existing clientele 
for business; and (iii) Companies prioritize profitability and remaining competitive over 
shifting business strategies to explore new markets. Still, some firms that are highly 
integrated in supply chains and relying on very few markets have reported or expect a 
substitution for destination of exports.  Some Philippines firms have declared they are 
shifting from the U.S, South America, and EU markets to mainly China and Taiwan. 
Firms in Turkey expect to export more to China, and regionally to Algeria, Egypt, UAE 
and Qatar, while they expect exports to U.S. and EU markets to decline. In Egypt, 
surveyed firms indicated a slight substitution from the U.S. and the EU to China, and Arab 
and African countries. Moreover, some of these firms that have been relying extensively 





Along with the rapid decline in trade and the reported freeze of trade finance, a critical 
question has emerged for policy makers in developing countries and development 
organizations about the extent to which exporters and importers in developing countries 
are being constrained by the trade finance freeze. The hypothesis is that the financial crisis 
may have reduced the supply of trade finance, and that the lack of it may deepen and 
prolong the recession, halting the economic growth of emerging economies and many 
poor countries already vulnerable. The trade finance “gap” was estimated using various 
methodologies (e.g., bank surveys, and drop in trade flows combined with an estimation of 
trade financed by trade finance instruments) and there seems to be a global convergence 
towards a “gap” of $250 billion
8. In this perspective, the World Bank survey of 425 
exporters and importers in 14 developing countries conducted six months after the 
beginning of the crisis sheds some light on the firms’ assessment of the crisis and the 




While most firms have reported a tightening in trade financing since September 2008, 
SMEs
9 were the most affected. The most often cited constraints relate to the increase in 
cost of trade financing instruments, banks’ more stringent selectivity and guarantee 
requirements, and delays in payments from buyers. SMEs are more vulnerable due 
generally to their low credit standing (low capability to provide collateral) and the 
tenuousness of their remaining viable in the face of the sharp and possibly prolonged 
                                                 
8 Chauffour, J.P. and Farole, T. (2009). “Trade Finance in Crisis: Market Adjustment or Market Failure?” Policy 
Research Working Paper 5003, World Bank 
9 New firms are also affected as reported by banks – see section III reporting finding from the banks survey 14 
 
decline in demand. Large corporations often rely more greatly on self-financing and 
retained earnings. Also in times of crisis, banks have been reported to follow a ‘flight-to-
quality’ strategy and offer better lending rates to large corporations which often are better 
capitalized and likely to be more resilient to a drop in demand.  
o  In Chile, bank interviews indicated that large firms that traditionally financed 
internationally have turned toward the domestic banks, crowding out domestic 
SMEs.  
o  In Indonesia, SMEs reported that the cost of trade finance has become more expensive 
than for larger firms.  
o  In Peru, interest rates for larger companies have increased twice as much as for 
SMEs.  
o  In the Philippines, multinational banks remained focused on larger domestic firms 
and multinational companies located in the country.  Little credit exposure is made 
to local, and, much less, smaller exporters. Moreover, the domestic banks 
maintained their trade credit lines with large, reputable exporters, while smaller 
exporters have been experiencing a reduction or even winding down of their trade 
credit lines. Larger firms have also access to lower interest rates, capital markets 
and greater assets to support their lending operations.  
 
Even firms that have not been relying extensively on the banking system for trade finance 
have also been affected. These firms usually use open account with self-financing, cash in 
advance and accounts payable.  The scarcity of trade finance originated from the slower 
demand from their export markets and the consequent drop in revenues, delays in payment 
terms by buyers, and shortening payment terms by suppliers.  This has in turn squeezed 
the capital base of exporters and importers, their working capital and capacity to self-
finance their transactions. It is typically firms that are integrated in global supply-chains 
with a zero-sum game between different segments of the value-chain: firms lower in the 
supply chain are more affected as a result of reduced access to credit by final 
suppliers/customers.  
o  In Indonesia where most firms in the sample produce consumer products and are 
assemblers of different semi-finished products to be final products, the impact has 
been large.  Exporters were experiencing an increase of up to 37 days in their cash 
flow cycle.   
o  In India, 60 percent of firms’ cash-to-cash cycle time has increased from 15 to 90 
days post September 2008; and 80 percent of firms reported overdue payment 
ranging from 5 to 70 percent of their sales. 
o  Firms in Turkey also complained about overdue payment, in particular when using 
a direct method of payment rather than safer method of payments such as Letters 
of Credit (LCs).  This may lead some firms to prefer safer methods of payments, 
provided that banks are willing to work with them. 
 
Yet, most firms highlighted that the drop in global demand was their top concern and that 
trade finance was not a major binding constraint. They noted that they could still handle 
these tightening conditions. These reports will be corroborated by the banks survey results 
in Section III as trade finance volumes have reportedly increased despite higher pricing in 
countries where trade flows have been somewhat sustained such as in Kenya and Ghana. 15 
 
Lack of trade finance might have been an acute problem in the aftermath of Lehman 
Brothers’ collapse when spreads picked up and trade finance instruments froze, but less so 
at the time when the survey was conducted (March-April 2009). It also made the ability of 
firms to diversify their export market more difficult at a time when demand from their 
main market has declined abruptly. The pressure might reemerge when the global 
economy picks up and the trade credit still tight. 
About a third of firms surveyed signaled that pre-export financing has been a major 
obstacle for exports (Figure 5). A quarter of the respondents declared it has become more 
of an obstacle since September 2008. The main issues raised by respondents are the cost 
of pre-export financing and refusal of banks to lend.  In particular, firms mentioned higher 
down payments, more collateral required and higher interest rates. Exporters in Peru, 
Ghana, South Africa, the Philippines, and Kenya, seem to be the most constrained for a 
variety of reasons related to the method of payment used, industry and firm’s size.  
o  In the case of commodity exporters in Peru and Ghana, using formalized method 
of payment (e.g., LCs) to fund pre-export financing, the issue is stricter bank 
selection criteria. In Peru, surveyed firms report that the problem is the higher cost 
in a range of 2% - 5%.    
o   For SMEs, with weaker capital base, and firms in global supply chains producing 
consumer goods such as in the Philippines and South Africa, using self-financing 
and buyer down payment, the issue is the drop in orders and payment delays that 
are constraining exporters’ cash-flows and importers’ liquidity. Also, turning to the 
banks in such instances is not always an alternative as banks prefer to work with 
existing clients. Indonesian firms seeking new markets have been constrained by 
the need to find information about these new markets and buyers, but also by the 
fact that banks would not lend them working capital for pre-shipment finance. 
Figure 5: Access to pre-export financing has been a problem for commodity exporters in 
Kenya, Ghana and Peru  

















While a majority of respondents declared traditionally not using export guarantees or trade 
credit insurance (Figure 6), surveyed firms highlighted that banks were requiring more of 
them as buyers’ banks were defaulting in some countries, and firms delaying payments 
and being at risk of insolvency. The predominant firms’ explanation for traditionally not 
using export guarantees is the presence of an established business relationship with the 
client not justifying the use of such an instrument. This is particularly the case for 
exporters with established clients, either commodity exporters or those in supply chains. 
The second most important reason is the cost of export guarantees, followed by poor 
services and limited coverage (Figure 7). For Kenyan exporters, although the African 
Trade Insurance Agency (Box 1) has been in existence for a number of years, it has so far 
limited its coverage to political risk insurance. Only recently, the agency has started to 
provide commercial risk insurance. It is also reportedly under-capitalized and understaffed 
for an institution with a regional dimension. 
 


























































Figure 7: … because it is not justified by client or method of payment 
 
 
Yet, where specialized institutions offer wider services such as in Tunisia, Peru, Turkey, 
and South Africa, a large number of firms declared using export guarantees or trade credit 
insurance. In South Africa, the Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation provides both 
guarantees and insurance services for short term credits, and the Export Credit Insurance 
Corporation that provides only insurance services for medium to long term credits.  In 
Tunisia, two large institutions, SOTUGAR and COTUNACE, provide a wide variety of 
services and coverage. Such commercial insurance cover is widely viewed as necessary to 
support more robust trade finance operations 
 
Surveyed firms reported that providing guarantees and insurance in times of crisis is more 
difficult.  In Chile, all firms reported that insurance companies have reduced their 
coverage as a result of the crisis.  Foreign companies were the first ones to react (they 
noted the effects of the crisis on their customer portfolio), but by the beginning of 2009 all 
Chilean insurance companies had already reacted in a similar way.  Insurance fees have 
not changed much because they are usually long term conditions; nevertheless, companies 
believe that these might increase in future negotiations as a consequence of the crisis.  
Most interviewees indicate that no specific countries have been vetoed and that in general 
insurance companies maintain coverage for existing customers, but that it is harder to 
obtain insurance for new customers. In Eastern Africa, pressure on the ATI to expand has 
increased as demand for insurance has recently amplified as a consequence of the 
tightening their lending requirements by banks. Respondents in the Philippines, Kenya, 
India and Peru noted that they would like their respective governments to provide more 
guarantees, as well as political and commercial risk insurance for export transactions.   In 
response to the crisis, some governments have also increased the coverage and the capital 
of publicly-owned guarantee and insurance agencies as in Tunisia (more in Section IV on 







































    
C.  Firms in Low­Income Countries (LICs)  
 
Surveyed firms in LICs (all three in Africa: Ghana, Kenya, and Sierra Leone) seem to 
have been less directly affected by the financial turmoil and rather struggle with long 
standing domestic issues and decline in commodity prices.  
i.  Firms have traditionally relied little on traditional trade finance instruments for 
export finance because either the local banking sector and institutions are poorly 
developed to start with, or banks find it difficult to find creditworthy customers. 
For example in Sierra Leone, commercial banks have traditionally have often 
preferred to take a conservative attitude to the granting of credit and invest in 
government Treasury Bills/Bonds. In Ghana, most institutions providing export 
finance tend to be undercapitalized. They have limited sources of raising deposits 
and fail to develop the working strategy at raising the right level of funding, be it 
capital or deposits.  
 
ii.  Most firms surveyed in these countries are commodity exporters with established 
buyers and secured credit lines or relying on self-financing. In Ghana, traditional 
exports of Cocoa, Gold and Timber that represent three-quarters of the country’s 
exports are mostly financed through offshore syndicated working capital 
borrowing and medium-term loans from international banks.  In March 2008, 
Ghana Cocoa Board was able to secure a three-year medium term loan deal of 
US$200 million from the Royal Bank of Scotland and Ghana International Bank. 
Cocoa prices have also gone up so corporate revenues have not been affected yet. 
Box 1: The African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI)  
ATI is an African Regional International Financial Institution established in 2001 by African States 
at the initiative of COMESA and with the financial and technical support of The World Bank 
Group. Its mandate consists of facilitating, encouraging and developing the provision of, or the 
support for, insurance, including co-insurance and reinsurance, guarantees and other financial 
instruments and services for the purposes of promoting trade, investment and other productive 
activities in Africa in supplement to those that may be offered by the public and private sector, or in 
cooperation with the public and private sector. Any exporter domiciled in one of the ATI Member 
States and exporting to a buyer outside Africa is eligible for credit insurance by ATI covering short 
term trade receivables usually not exceeding 120 days. The products are distributed via a web of 
brokers. The risk is mitigated through re-insurance services of various international organizations on 
a 60/40 basis (60% of the risk is to remain with ATI). 
 
ATI has recently been restructured to provide not only political risk cover for the countries of 
Eastern Africa but also commercial risk cover (up to 90%) to exporters on their receivables from 
anywhere in the world. The trade credit insurance product has been launched a year ago but has only 
recently become operational.  The means of ATI in terms of manpower are still relatively small 
given the number of countries covered.  19 
 
In Sierra Leone, no formal arrangements for export financing exist. For diamond 
and rutile/bauxite exporters in Sierra Leone relying mainly on self financing, the 
trade finance crush originates from a drop in commodity prices - diamond prices 
have fallen on the international market by between 30% and 50% since September 
2008. This has led to the squeezing of exporters’ revenues and foreign exchange 
reserves. 
 
iii.  Moreover, the turmoil in the trade credit market seems to be relatively less of a 
priority for policy makers in these economies dealing with from serious 
macroeconomic imbalances that have been undermining the business environment 
for many years. In Ghana, as at the end of 2008, fiscal deficit stood at US$2,131 
million, about 15% of GDP which is the highest over the past 10 years. Inflation as 
at the end of January was 19.5%. In Kenya, many banks have stopped lending and 
tightened their lending criteria because of the sharp economic slowdown Kenya is 
facing due to the serious drought the country is facing and the resulting low food 





One of the objectives of the survey was to test the hypothesis that given the drop in global 
demand and the uncertainty prevailing in the banking system, firms would switch towards 
more formalized methods of payments such as letters of credits and documentary 
collection. According to the survey results, most firms have not changed their payment 
requirements with trading partners essentially because the key factor determining the type 
of payment is the nature of business relationship (Figures 8 and 9). Firms are also equally 
sensitive to the good standing of the buyer’s bank and the country of operation. Only six 
percent of the respondents declared that they would change their method of payment 
because of the increased pricing of trade finance instruments.  
 
About two-thirds of surveyed exporters and importers reported that their preferred method 
of payment is open account and cash in advance/pre-payment. This pattern is particularly 
pronounced for firms surveyed in Tunisia, Turkey and Indonesia, which are highly 
integrated in global supply-chains and work with recurrent clients. Trustworthiness and a 
sound business relationship are prevalent. Moreover, SMEs reported using more cash in 
advance/pre-payment than large firms do. Since this is one of the riskiest methods of 
payment, the heavier reliance of SMEs on this method probably reflects their weaker 









Figure 8: Majority of respondents declared they have not changed their methods of 




























While the crisis has led some firms to choose more formalized and secured transactions 
such as LCs and documentary collection to avoid delays in payments that are highest with 
direct method of payment, the survey does not reveal an obvious shift towards more 
































o  First, the shortfall in trade finance and drop in trade volumes have been relatively 
sudden and of a larger magnitude than anyone would have expected a few months 
earlier. This contributed to increase the degree of business uncertainty and might 
have led to a “wait and see mode” attitude as reported by some firms.    
 
o  Second, in a world where lean retailing and fragmentation of production prevail, 
buyers are the drivers. As a consequence, it seems that the crisis has not reversed 
the secular trend of moving away from L/Cs to open accounts. Firms are rather 
concerned about keeping their clients and not taking the risk to jeopardize a long-
term relationship based on trust. Exporters in Egypt reported that it is still 
preferable to use open account to facilitate transactions and get deals. SMEs doing 
business with large firms also find it difficult to request for LCs. Some interviewed 
Indian sellers, largely small and dispersed, reported that they do not have a lot of 
bargaining power with large buyers, so it is difficult to ask for L/Cs, let alone cash-
in-advance. In the Philippines, firms reported to continue to prefer avoiding these 
formal transactions with banks that tend to be demanding and costly and choose 
alternative sources of financing such as through family members. 
 
o  Third, some local banks in developing countries have somewhat lost confidence in 
L/Cs issued by buyers’ banks, often in rich countries, as a result of the inability of 
buyers to pay what they ordered. Thus, the “sanctity” of the L/Cs has diminished. 
Finally, the slow global economy and drop in global trade volume have translated 
into a drop in the use of all trade finance instruments (LCs and short-term loans) as 
reported by most banks interviewed (see next section). Therefore, any drop in LCs 





The World Bank survey also included interviews of a total of 78 banks and financial 
institutions in 13 developing countries (excl. Indonesia) to assess any changes and trends 
in trade credit volumes post-September 2008.  This is particularly useful in light of the 
absence of data on trade finance. Comprehensive statistical compilation of flows is 
difficult to extract from balance of payments due to the high cost of information, 
technology needed, and the difficulty to guarantee a high level of accuracy to very short 
term capital movements
10.  From the countries surveyed, only two of them (Brazil, and 
Turkey) had macro trade finance data available overt time as described below. Moreover, 
a large part of trade finance transactions takes place between buyers and suppliers which 
are not required to report their transactions.   
Against this background, the bank surveys aimed to produce qualitative results and were 
conducted through phone or in-person interviews.  The bank questionnaire covers bank 
lending activities and practices pertaining to trade loans, trade credits, and short and 
medium-term financing for export and import transactions from September 2008 to April 
                                                 
10 At present, the only available and reliable source of statistics comes from the Berne Union database, which provides 
data on the amount of business of export credit agencies. 22 
 
2009.  Overall trends from the survey indicate that trade finance has been noticeably 
constrained post-September 2008 as illustrated by increased pricing of trade loans and 
short-term financing, shortened payment terms, requests for more guarantees, and 
tightened counterparty bank requirements.  This general trend applies to the majority of 
the banks across the 13 countries.  
A.  Pricing of trade loans increased but not a binding constraint  
 
The majority of surveyed banks indicate that the pricing of trade loans and credits have 
gone up since the 4
th quarter of 2008.  The survey findings show an array of factors 
affects the pricing of trade loans and credits, with some variation depending on the bank’s 
country of origin, the bank’s exposure to international financial markets, its cash reserve 
ratio and capital requirements and the demands and profile of its clientele.  Most banks 
have cited the increase in cost of funds as causing the increase in local pricing of trade 
finance instruments.                                      
 
o  In Brazil, the ACC
11 interest rates, traditionally considered “cheap money” for 
Brazilian standards, are priced on the basis of the London Interbank Offered Rate 
(Libor) plus a spread rate, normally amounting to 5% to 8% for the exporting 
company. On September 17
th, the day after Lehman Brothers crashed, interest rates 
began a rising trend from 5.6% to 13.7% in October 3
rd – the worst day of the 
series (Figure 10). But by the end of January, the pressure seemed to have eased 
with the rate settling at round 9% – albeit in the presence of volatility.  
 
Figure 10: Brazil’s ACC Annual Interest Rates  
 
    
 
o  In Chile, the banking sector suffered from the notorious spread increase in the 
operations to obtain resources from foreign Banks. Between September and 
October the spread over Libor for 180-day operations increased by around 150 
basis points, according to our interviewees.   Financing options for terms longer 
than or equal to 360 days all but disappeared.  By November, spreads began 
decreasing but they continued to be significantly higher than before September 
2008, as of February 2009 (Figure 11). Reports of spread increases are not 
particular to Chile but rather widespread as indicated in the rest of the section. 
                                                 
11 The “Adiantamento de Contrato de Câmbio” (ACC) is one of the most important exports suppliers credit modality 
used in Brazil. Basically, it is an anticipation of financial resources related to export contracts and it has the purpose of 
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Other banks have noted that increased capital requirements affected its pricing structure. 
Banks in India attributed increased pricing to higher capital requirements imposed by the 
Central Bank of India (RBI), with the majority of banks reporting that LC prices have 
risen by 10-30 percent and all banks reported that short-term financing has increased by 
35 to 150 basis points above LIBOR.  Finally, some banks such as in Egypt reported that 
they have resorted to rationing of credits as a safeguard lack of confidence and risk 
aversion after September 2008.   
 
Yet, banks have not reported the increased pricing as a factor explaining the drop in 
volumes of trade finance. Factors that have reportedly contributed to the decline in 
volumes include (i) a drop in demand for trade loans and credits by firms due to the global 
economic recession; (ii) difficulty in finding creditworthy customers; (iii) and risk 
aversion for short-term loans in bank portfolios.  
 
These reports are corroborated by more macro data available for Turkey and Brazil. In 
Brazil, export finance volume started falling as of October 2008. The average volume of 
export pre-payment, one of the most important suppliers credit modality used in Brazil, 
dropped an alarming 42 percent in comparison with the monthly average volume of 2007. 
In January 2009, the worst month of the historical series, pre-payment reached only $1.5 
billion, representing a fall of 63 percent in comparison with January 2008 and 60 percent 
compared to the average volume of 2007. In Turkey, value of letters of credit issued by 
the Turkish banking sector declined by 25 percent between September and December 
2008. Similarly, export credits provided by the Turkish banking sector decreased by 13 
percent during the same period, putting a halt to a positive trend since 2004 (Figures 12 
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Figure 12: Total amount of LCs by 
Turkish banking sector (million USD) 
 Figure 13: Total amount of export credits by 
Turkish banking sector (million USD) 
 





The demand effect seems to explain to a larger extent the drop in banks’ volumes of trade 
loans. In Ghana where exports of cocoa kept up, banks reported an increase in the volume 
of letters of credit and short-term financing for the period September-December 2008 
versus comparable period in 2007 despite an increase in the cost of financing for both 
instruments. Similarly, in Kenya where both imports and exports increased, trade credit 
increased in 2008 despite an increase in lending rates making trade credits to the private 





Very few surveyed banks have reported lack of liquidity in local currency as 
constraining their supply of trade finance. Banks in Sierra Leone have traditionally been 
liquid but not providing export finance because of a scarcity of creditworthy customers, 
among other things.  The banking systems in most of the other countries, in particular in 
Chile, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa and Tunisia, also appear as well-capitalized in local 
currency and have not experienced liquidity constraints since the onset of the crisis
12.  In 
contrast, some banks have reported more difficulty accessing liquidity in foreign 
currencies which have become more scarce and expensive as a consequence of the 
liquidity crunch in western banks in a first stage, and the drop in export revenues. Banks 
had more difficulties financing large import transactions such as big purchases of 
equipments or large investments by public companies as reported by Tunisian banks. 
                                                 
12 The relatively secured position of the Chilean Banks seems to be the consequence of a delayed impact of the crisis and 
the macro position of Chile. The banking sector in Chile has become strongly capitalized, highly regulated, and fairly 
concentrated after the dramatic crisis of 1982.  Furthermore, in Chile, while the banking sector and the private 











































































































































Sierra Leone has started feeling a severe shortage of foreign exchange due to several 
factors including the drop in export earnings and personal remittances.  
However, the majority of banks reported that they have tightened counterparty bank 
criteria, excluding certain banks and countries in lending portfolios.  They are requesting 
for additional insurance and confirmation from banks, conducting detailed due diligence 
to pre-select counterparties, being more restrictive and risk averse towards new markets, 
new clients and new products, and adding additional safeguards to loans via guarantees 
and higher confirmation fees.   With lack of liquidity in local currency not being reported 
as a major constraint, risk aversion in the banking system with regard to client firms may 
translate a risk mitigation strategy in case the crisis prevails or worsens.  
 
Bank interviews also corroborate the reports by firms discuss earlier with regard to the 
banks’ criteria for tightening.  Interviewed banks confirm that they are more likely to 
impose stringent conditions on SMEs than larger firms and for firms operating in 
industries that are the most affected by the crisis:   
o  In Chile, larger firms that have previously relied on foreign capital have turned 
back to domestic financial markets, causing a “flight to quality” scenario, 
crowding-out SMEs and new firms by making lending criteria more restrictive.   
o  Banks in the Philippines indicated that lending decisions have become more 
stringent for some exporters in certain industries such as garment, furniture and 
electronics. Some banks have refused lending to some exporters while other banks 
have significantly tightened lending criteria such as requiring more collateral.   
 
The perception of geographical risk by banks has changed post-September 2008.  
Surveyed banks have tightened criteria for risky banks from countries that have been 
directly affected by the crisis, such as the U.S.A, the EU, China and Iceland.  However, 
some banks have also added an array of banks in other countries due to political and 
commercial risk considerations.  For instance, the list of countries that banks in Turkey 
have tightened or restrict lending to include India, U.S., Italy, Korea, Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Ukraine, Hungary, the Baltic Countries, Pakistan, India, the UAE, Bangladesh, Algeria 
and Libya.  Similarly, some banks in Chile have tightened operations with counterparty 
banks from wide-ranging locations including Russia, Ecuador, Venezuela, Argentina and 
other countries in Eastern Europe. This is in contrast to firms’ ‘wait-and-see’ mode in 
terms of changing geographical destination and origin for exports/imports as described in 




Notwithstanding the impact of the crisis on firms and banks, many governments have 
quickly sought to mitigate the potential impact of the crisis on their domestic economy 
and export sector. Therefore, one of the objectives of this survey was to collect 
information on measures taken by governments to mitigate the impact of the financial 
crisis on trade and trade finance. Our findings reveal that all governments of countries 
where the survey took place enacted or planned to implement supporting policies, albeit in 26 
 
varying degrees and forms.  These include various combinations of short-term solutions to 
provide immediate relief to firms and banks, and of long-term adjustment strategies to 
bolster countries’ export competitiveness.  The main actions taken by governments can be 
grouped in two categories: (i) to increase banks’ liquidity to alleviate liquidity pressure 
including for trade finance; (ii) to enhance the long-term competitiveness of the country’s 
exports by developing and expanding export promotion programs (Annex 2 summarizes 
the government actions taken by the 14 countries surveyed as of April 2009).  





As soon as reports about western banks lacking liquidity has spurred many governments 
of developing countries to inject preemptively liquidity into the financial system to 
encourage alleviate the financial pressure on firms and support trade-related lending.   
Most governments of the surveyed countries have often implemented a combination of 
measures to lower lending rates and extend maturities for borrowers, to provide new lines 
of credit for pre- and post-shipment transactions to ensure that trade financing and 
working capital needs are met, and to expand export guarantee and insurance programs for 
risk mitigation.  The list below illustrates some of the broad measures implemented by the 
various governments to increase banks’ liquidity: 
o  Some governments initiated interest rate adjustments to encourage bank lending.  
The Egyptian Government reduced overnight deposit lending rates; the Turkish 
Central Bank increased its discount limits; and the Indian Government extended 
interest rate ceilings for export credit.   
o  Some governments such as India, the Philippines, and Peru coordinated with 
domestic banks to reschedule debt payments for firms.  The Indonesian Central 
Bank took the initiative to re-open its facility for private banks to rediscount their 
exports LCs. 
o  Governments such as of Tunisia and Kenya required banks to lower their cash 
reserve capital requirements to generate additional lending capabilities.  The 
Tunisian Central Bank decreased the rate of compulsory reserves in January 2009 
to make available to the banking system additional liquidity of about TD250 
million, and lowered its rate from 5.25 to 4.5% to help reduce the cost of financing 
for companies (as of February 2009). 
ECAs have been instrumental to governments to channel trade finance to firms. In 
addition to the above broad measures, some governments’ actions directly targeted the 
reportedly lack of trade finance available to firms. Interestingly, while some governments 
have tried to achieve this objective by establishing rediscount and refinance facilities to 
increase liquidity for trade loans and export credit, many have implemented direct 
measures through the established ECAs or Ex-Im Banks.  When public, these entities 
typically serve as channels for the government to issue trade credits, loans, and guarantees 
and insurance to the private sector.   In many of the surveyed countries, public ECAs and 
Ex-Im Banks served as the “providers of last resort” for trade finance as in Brazil, India, 
the Philippines, South Africa and Turkey. ECAs and Ex-Im Banks were used by national 
governments to channel new lines of trade credits and loans.    27 
 
o  The Brazilian government established new credit lines via the National Bank for 
Economic and Social Development (BNDES) to provide pre-export and export 
finance;  
o  The Indian government established a refinance facility of RS 50Bn for the Ex-Im 
Bank of India and extended interest rate ceilings for export credit;  
o  In Tunisia, the government has injected capital to a quasi-government entity, 
CONTUNACE, to increase its capital base by 6 million Dinars; 
o  The South African government proposed the introduction of a pre-shipment 
facility for select industries;  
o  In Turkey, the government has expanded Export-Import Bank of Turkey’s export 
credit and insurance facilities.   
Other public entities have also been instrumental. Some other governments intervened 
through government-owned or supported development banks that serve as sources of 
“second-floor” financing to direct trade finance to private lenders and borrowers. The 
Chilean government has leveraged its fiscal surplus and has tried to permanently assure a 
reasonable level of liquidity and foreign currency to favor the normal performance of the 
banking system, notably through CORFO, the economic development agency providing 
business financing. As early as October 2008, CORFO announced new credit lines of 
“Second Floor” financing exclusively dedicated to satisfying working capital needs and to 
providing funds to non-banks factoring agencies.  The government also injected liquidity 
into the Credit Insurance Programs for exporters and added significant funds to FOGAPE, 
a program managed by the Banco Estado (the only State Bank in Chile), which provides 
default insurance for credit given to small companies. All programs conceptually continue 
to rely on the decision of private banks regarding to whom to lend, something that is 
valued positively by interviewed firms.   Moral hazard is diminished in that always 
insurance is partial, and therefore, a private credit risk evaluation has to take place 
anyway. The policy objectives of these public measures were designed to help viable 
firms to maintain financing access by tackling commercial credit shortage in general and 
not only trade finance scarcity.  Policies do not differentiate between firms that trade 
internationally or locally. However, the government also has strengthened the existing 
tools that favor credit access to small companies and export companies in particular. 
In the absence of formal government’s entities that offer trade finance instruments, some 
governments decided to set them up or make them into law, and use other public bodies.  
In Indonesia, the government passed legislation in December 2008 to transform an 
existing government agency into an official Export-Import Bank that would provide 
funding and insurance for trade finance.  In Ukraine, the parliament passed a law that 
granted the Ukreximbank the status of official export credit agency and supports plans to 
establish a government export insurance company, "Ukrainian Export Insurance 
Company”.  In Sierra Leone, the government has recently established the Sierra Leone 
Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA), which has the responsibility of 
providing export finance and export credit guarantees.  
 
Development organizations’ trade credit lines are also an alternative resource to 
increase liquidity for trade finance. A last group of countries have sought to increase 
domestic banks’ offer of trade finance by requesting new lines of credit from international 
and regional development banks. This is particularly the case in LICs where banks have 28 
 
already established such credit lines. In Sierra Leone and Kenya, large public banks have 
benefitted from the confirming lines of credit issued by the World Bank private arm, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), and covering the political risk of the country of 
the issuing bank, as well as the risk of the bank itself. In Sierra Leone, the two 
government-owned banks, Sierra Leone Commercial Bank Ltd and Rokel Commercial 
Bank Ltd, both have IFC LC confirmation lines of US$1 million which have been fully 
utilized. Banks are now seeking to increase them to US$3 million
13. The new Nigerian 
banks established in Sierra Leone are more familiar with LCs financing than the local 
banks and have confirmation lines from their parent banks, which are already being 
utilized to some degree. In Kenya, the IFC is experiencing an increased demand since the 
international corresponding banks have been pulling out. The IFC is also investigating the 
possibility to provide confirming lines to a number of new banks in the Kenyan market 






Some governments have taken the crisis as an opportunity to spur and/or institute 
programs and policies that promote the competitiveness of their domestic sector and 
exports.   Such measures range from establishing new industrial sites and export 
promotion agencies to initiatives that aim to help firms promote their products overseas 
more effectively.   Export promotion measures have reportedly been undertaken by the 
governments of Egypt, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and Tunisia.    
o  In Egypt, the government has allocated funds to develop new industrial sites and 
establish programs geared for export promotion.   
o  In Sierra Leone, the government has revamped the Sierra Leone Investment and 
Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) to provide export finance as well as export 
promotion for domestic firms
14.   
o  In the Philippines, the government plans to provide a subsidy of P1 billion to the 
Export Development Fund to fund priority projects that will facilitate exports.   
o  The Tunisian government has introduced a number of measures to support 
exporters experiencing a reduction in their activity to mitigate the social impact of 
crisis in terms of unemployment and benefits, as well as a reform program to boost 
the competitiveness of the economy in the long term (Box 2).  
  
                                                 
13 Some private banks have access to IFC LCs confirmation lines but have reportedly not utilized them yet. 
14 The Sierra Leone government is also considering the option of setting up the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing 
















































Box 2: Tunisian government actions to support firms in difficulty during the crisis and spur the 
export sector  
To mitigate the impact of the crisis, the Tunisian government introduced a number of measures to secure 
the recovery of eligible* export companies in difficulty by improving their cash flow and lowering their 
financial costs.  These measures did not include support to local banks as the government considers that 
they have not been affected by the crisis. Banks were rather instructed to be more flexible with companies 
affected by the crisis, to try to reschedule their outstanding commitments and to avoid their closure.  
  Some of the measures targeted at firms in difficulty 
1.  Support by the State of 50% of the contribution to social security during the appeal period to 
reduce working time due to the slowdown in their activity. 
2.  Support by the State of the contribution to social security when technical workers are 
unemployed because of the reduction in business in foreign markets.  
3.  Support by the State of 50% of the cost of insurance of export and the encouragement of 
“Compagnie Tunisienne pour l'assurance du commerce extérieur” (COTUNACE) to carry out the 
reinsurance of risks. Furthermore, the State increases the COTUNACE capital by 6 million dinars 
(MDT) in addition to the MDT4 by stockholders. 
4.  Support by the State of two interest rate points for exporters rescheduling their debt.  
5.  Allow credit institutions to deduct the ordinary and compound interest rates and interest on 
arrears which these institutions have foregone under the rescheduling operation in the property 
tax on companies.  
6.  Reduced refund time for tax credits and accelerated release of companies' claims in respect of 
public procurement.  
7.  Enlarging the access to FAMEX 2, the Export Market Access Fund, to include 200 new 
companies during the 2009, in addition to the 800 current beneficiaries. 
8.  Enable anti-dumping mechanisms and implement a specific program to reduce parallel trade. 
9.  Increased budget for fairs and exhibitions and to intensify campaigns to promote tourism. 
  In addition, the Tunisian government has engaged in an ambitious reform program supported 
by a World Bank lending project to enhance the competitiveness of the economy: 
1.  Reduce the number of MFN tariff bands from 9 to 5 by 2011 with the objective to reach an 
average MFN rate of 15%. 
2.  Streamline the non-tariff measures and import control techniques. 
3.  Implement the Single Window in the main port by 2011. 
4.  Put in place an information system to fight against counterfeit. 
5.  Elaborate a strategy to promote services exports, notably health care services, ICT, and 
professional services. 
6.  Reduce the VAT refund time for exporters to 7 days 
7.  A number of measures to modernize the financial sector and improve the business environment. 
*Eligibility criteria: Proof of a real decline of activity; Proof of non-payment by customers; Having 
suffered cancellations of orders; and having received a request for significant drop in orders that were 
already planned. In addition, measures 1 and 2 are available for totally exporting companies only. 
Source: Consultant’s report and World Bank 200930 
 
In their efforts to mitigate the impact of the crisis and support exports, many governments 
have benefitted from the financial support and the technical assistance provided by 
development organizations such as the World Bank Group (WBG) and regional 
development banks as well as the International Monetary Fund.  The WBG has expanded 
the liquidity of local banks through the existing Global Trade Finance Program, and the 
set-up of the Global Trade Liquidity Program. Most of the activities aimed at increasing 
lines of credits available for SMEs and supporting the capitalization of EXIM banks. 
Some activities have a regional dimension such as the strengthening of the Africa Trade 
Insurance Agency to facilitate the provision of insurance, including coinsurance and 
reinsurance, guarantees and other financial instruments and services for regional 
integration. In addition, the WBG expanded its lending and assistance to support the 
export competitiveness of developing countries (Annex 3 for more details on these 




Since most of the actions to increase liquidity available to firms only took effect during 
the 4th quarter of 2008 or 1st quarter of 2009, their impact on banks’ trade credit and 
firms’ liquidity could not be captured at the time of the survey.   However, information 
collected during the firm and bank interviews gives some indication on the perception and 
the early impact of these actions. In Chile, while banks and firms positively valued the 
government response to the crisis as being well intended and generally well designed, they 
think the amounts will be far below of what it may be needed to cope with the situation. In 
Kenya, the central bank initiative to reduce the cash reserve ratio from 6% to 5% effective 
since December 2008 had still not have major effects on the banking sector lending since 
the cash ratio of the banks has not decreased considerably.  On the contrary, the excess 
reserves of the banks increased by almost 2.5 times, meaning that the government actions 
mainly shifted liquidity from obligatory to excess reserves. Interest rates also did not go 
down. The high inflation rates and the economic slowdown to only 2.2 percent in 2008 
have resulted in risk-averse lending practices by banks since they are fearing companies to 
fail and a substantial increase of non-performing loans in their portfolios.  Interviewed 
firms in Kenya and Sierra Leone noted that they would like the IFC to expand existing 
credit lines and/or explore ways to assist their countries in obtaining more trade finance 
One possible explanation to the lack of response to policy measures that aim to increase 
the liquidity of the financial system to provide working capital and trade financing during 
the crisis is that lending decisions depend first of all on whether banks allocate available 
credits and loans to trade finance portfolios vis-à-vis other loan portfolios. Secondly, 
lending is contingent on counterpart criteria pertaining to firm size, industry focus and the 
country for export destination and/or import origination.  As mentioned previously, many 
surveyed banks indicate that they have tightened counterpart criteria for specific countries 
due to political or commercial risks, have become more discriminatory towards SME 
borrowers that have shorter credit histories, and have curtailed lending to specific sectors 
deemed more affected by a contraction in global demand.  Therefore, whatever the 
liquidity position of banks, since lending decisions are not solely dependent on liquidity 31 
 
but also banks’ perception and valuation of risks, liquidity boosting policies may or may 
not translate into increased lending for trade transactions.     
 
A recent paper by the World Bank highlights the possible rationales for governments’ 
intervention in support of trade finance such as when markets are undergoing a temporary 
adjustment process with real costs for trading companies and for the economy as a whole.  
The government intervention can speed up the adjustment process or compensates the 
short-term losers. It is also justifiable in terms of the inherent potential multiplier effects 
given the importance of credit chains and the propagation effects of these chains, the 
complementary nature of trade finance with other forms of firm financing such as 
investment and working capital. The paper also cautions against the notion of a large trade 
finance “gap” leading to the need to inject liquidity in the international financial system. A 
number of reasons might explain why bank might restrict the supply of trade finance more than 
other forms of bank credit such as a temporary inability of the market to properly calculate risk, a 
collapse of interbank trust and a hoarding for cash, raising the risk of interbank strategic default, 
banks’ urgent need to recapitalize, and supply and demand failing to meet as prices to supply 
trade finance went too high (World Bank 2009
15). 
 
Similarly, the ultimate success of export promotion measures is difficult to ascertain in the 
short term, and survey interviews did not indicate whether these policies are particularly 
effective at addressing trade finance constraints. In Tunisia, only 62 firms in difficulty 
were eligible for the government contribution to social security charges as of April 2009, 
of which only five benefited from the banks two interest point discount when rescheduling 
their debt. It is argued that the government’s plan might be unrealistic because the overall 
cost of support has not been announced, and there is no dedicated fund to deal with the 
crisis, not a guarantee fund for banks dealing with firms affected by the crisis. Therefore, 
banks would tend to reject applications for funding. Respondents from Ukraine’s banking 
industry indicated that the lack of predictability and transparency in its country’s trade and 
economic policies complicated bank operations and funding allocation decisions.    
 
In sum, this section sheds light on the usefulness of Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) or 
Export-Import Banks (Ex-Im Banks) and other governments’ bodies in times of trade 
financial crises.  Had not these institutions been there, the policy response would have 
probably been less easy and quick to set-up.   For LICs, the use of lines of trade credit by 
publicly-owned banks and extended by development banks has emerged as another 
alternative to increase the liquidity for firms. 
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Conclusion 
Looking forward, the recovery of the global economy and the fiscal stimulus packages put 
in place by many governments will ease the pressure on firms’ export revenues and trade 
finance capacity. However, trade credit may remain tight for a longer period and constrain 
some trade transactions. Notwithstanding the developments of the crisis, this survey raises 
some longer-term issues that deserve special attention from policy makers and 
international organizations, in particular:  
(i)  What kind of mechanisms should economies have to make sure that trade finance 
funds remain available for firms when private banks default or become risk averse? 
While this crisis is exceptional in terms of its size, financial crises have occurred more 
often at the country or regional level, and hindered temporarily the channeling of trade 
finance through the banking system. Therefore, should governments establish ECAs and 
ExIm banks to channel directly increased funds to viable traders? While these might be 
useful to channel liquidity during crises, they might be too costly to set up and 
administer in normal times. They can also create distortions in the trade finance market 
as they would generate moral hazard behavior.  
(ii)  How to alleviate the trade finance constraints in low-income countries even in 
normal times? These countries suffer from poorly developed financial systems, which 
are constraining SMEs and firms trying to diversify away from commodity exports. 
Many economies also suffer from lack of private or government export credit guarantee 
and insurance programs to support private banks in their decision to lend to exporters. 
IFC confirmation lines are being used by some banks, but it seems that there is scope to 




This report reflects the results obtained from a survey of 425 firms in 14 developing 
countries of different income level across six regions (Figure 14). The same questionnaire 
developed by the World Bank was used by local consultants in these countries. It covers 
firms’ trade developments and prospects, their method and source of payment for pre-
export, import and export finance.  The survey was conducted in March/April 2009 and 
covered the period from September to December 2008/first quarter of 2009 versus 
comparable periods in 2007. The objective was to highlight changes since the onset of the 
global financial crisis in the 4
th Quarter of 2008.  In all these countries, the surveyors 
targeted a large number of exporters and 
importers from different industries and of 
different size. Questionnaires were sent 
by email and made available online. 
However, given time constraints and the 
low level of spontaneous response, most 
questionnaires were administered 
directly or via phone interview by the 
surveyors. As a result, the sample of 
firms surveyed in each country is not 
homogeneous across countries, and 
interpretation and comparison of results 
across countries need to be conducted 
carefully. 
The Regions that are most represented in the sample are East Asia (32 percent) and Sub-
Saharan Africa (24 percent). Almost two-thirds of firms are based in Low Middle Income 
countries (Figure 15). Overall, 75 percent of the firms in the sample declared that they 
were not part of a global supply chain. However the proportion in each country varies 
(Figure 16). More firms are part of a supply chain in Tunisia, Chile and Peru. On the 
contrary, very few firms surveyed in Ghana, Kenya and Sierra Leone are part of such a 
network. Similarly, 77 percent of the firms in the sample declared they are not partially or 
fully owned by multinational firms, except for two outliers, Chile and Peru (and to some 
extent India) where most firms surveyed is partially or fully owned by a multinational 
firm. Finally, most firms are SMEs except in Brazil, Turkey, India and Chile where the 




































Figure 14: Country Breakdown of Sample34 
 
 





Figure 16: Number of Firms that are Part of a Global Supply Chain  













































































The World Bank survey included interviews with 78 banks and financial institutions in 13 
developing countries (excl. Indonesia) to assess any changes and trends post-September 
2008 (See Figure 19).  The bank surveys aimed to produce qualitative results and were 
conducted through phone or in-person interviews.  The bank questionnaire covers bank 
lending activities and practices pertaining to trade loans (including Letters of Credit), trade 
credits, and short and medium-term financing for export and import transactions from 
September 2008 to April 2009.   
 
 







































Type of Support:  Country  Government Action(s) and Plan(s): 
 
  Trade Finance 





  Established an international line of credit for exports and prioritized lending in trade-related foreign currency 
operations  
  Provided financing via the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (or BNDES); BNDES will provide 
R$19Bn in credit lines, R$10Bn for pre-shipment lines of credit and US$4Bn for trade finance. 











  Established new lines of financing and insurance through Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (Production 
Promoting Corporation) or CORFO, the government agency that provides financial support to the private sector.    
  In October 2008, CORFO announced a new US$200M line of “second floor” financing for working capital needs, 
another US$100M “second floor” line for non-bank factoring agencies, a US$500M in long-term loans to finance 
investments and US$50M for its guarantee fund for exporters.    
  In January 2009, the Government announced a US$4Bn ‘Plan for Fiscal Incentives’ that includes the creation of a new 
CORFO Fund of US$50M to cover default insurance for SME credits.  
  The Government added an additional US$130M for a program managed by Bankco Estado, the State Bank, to provide 
default insurance for SME credits. 
  Export Promotion 




  In December 2008, the Government introduced reductions in import tariffs and sales tax rebates for importers.   
  In Q1-2009, the Central Bank cut overnight deposit and lending rates by 150 bp to 10% and 12%, respectively. It also 
counted loans to SME's as part of reserve requirement holdings of commercial banks. 
  The Government has allocated funds to develop new industrial sites and special programs for export promotion. 
 
  Bank 
Support/Liquidity 
 
     Ghana 
  The Government has recently established requirements that commercial banks raise their capital reserves from GH¢7 












The Reserve Bank of India (the Central Bank) has implemented the following measures:  
  Interest rate ceiling on rupee credit has been extended to the end of Q1-09 
  Interest rates ceiling on import and export credit (foreign currency denominated) were increased  
  Interest rate for post-shipment rupee export credit was extended;  
  Limit of Export Credit Refinance facility has been increased from 15% to 50% to provide additional liquidity support 
to banks; 
  Increase in period of entitlement for both pre- and post-shipment credit at a concessional rate;  
  Established a refinance facility of RS 50Bn for the EXIM Bank of India; 
  Interest subsidy has been extended for pre and post-shipment export credit (in rupees) for textiles, handicrafts, carpets, 
leather, gems and jewelry, marine products and specifically for SMEs. 
 
  Trade Finance 





  The Government passed a bill to establish an Export-Import Bank in December 2008 that aims to transform an existing 
institution (Bank Ekspor Indonesia) into an Export-Import Bank (Exim) which would provide funding and insurance 
for trade finance. 
  The Government is planning to put in place a Rediscount Facility at the Bank of Indonesia to handle L/C-based trade 
receivables and provide liquidity.   
  The Government has plans to recapitalize PT. (Persero) Asuransi Ekspor Indonesia (ASEI), the country’s export credit 
guarantee and insurance agency, with Rp 1.5 trillion and its Export-Import Bank with Rp 3 trillion.  
  The Government has established requirement for exporters across the board to use L/Cs.  This measure is aimed to 
mitigate buyer and non-payments risks, but could also increase trade finance costs, especially for those exporters that 
operate with open accounts.  
  Bank 
Support/Liquidity 
Kenya    The Central Bank reduced the cash reserve ratio from 6% to 5% in December 2008 to increase liquidity.   
 
 
  Trade Finance 





  Passed a US$3Bn stimulus plan in January 2009 to support local infrastructure and to address the crisis.  
  The national development bank (called COFIDE), the Central Bank, the Superintendence of Banks and Insurances and 
the main state-owned bank (Banco de la Nacion) have coordinated to reschedule debt payments for firms; 
  A credit line of US$ 400M from the Banco de la Nacion to COFIDE has been authorized for mortgage and other credit 
lines.  
  Expanded insurance coverage to US$6M for SME exporters through SEPYMEX (a COFIDE program to promote 
SMEs through export insurance coverage for pre-shipment financing). 







Type of Support:  Country  Government Action(s) and Plan(s): 
 
 
  Export Promotion 
  Trade Finance 






  The Central Bank of the Philippines (BSP) expanded its rediscount window to increase loans for banks by raising the 
total amount available from P40Bn to P60Bn; increasing the value of loans to rediscounted loan papers from 80% to 
90%; lowering interest rates charged on rediscounting; and setting at below-market rates or 0.5% below the reverse 
repurchase agreement rate.  
  The Government passed an amendment to the Magna Carta for SME Law, requiring banks to allocate up to 10% of 
their loan portfolio to SMEs.  
  The Philippines Export-Import Agency (Philexport) plans to expand its guarantee capacity by increasing its Tier 2 
capital (via subordinated debt issue) to P1.4 Bn, but this expansion is still awaiting the National Government’s 
approval.   
  The Government plans to provide a subsidy of P1 Bn to the Export Development Fund (EDF) in May 2009 to facilitate 
exporters.  The EDF is managed by the Export Development Council, of which Philexport is a main pillar. 
 




  The Government has revamped the Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA), a government 
agency that promotes exports and inward investment that has also been tasked to provide export finance and export 
credit guarantees.  
  The Government is considering the option of setting up the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Company to regulate and 
improve the quality of its cocoa and coffee exports. 
 
  Regulatory 
Reform 





  The Financial Services Board of South Africa has initiated a pending legislation on tightening regulations for hedge 
fund for risk mitigation purposes. 
  The Government articulated in a policy document, “Framework for South Africa’s Response to the International 
Economic Crisis”, its plan to provide a pre-shipment facility for selected sectors. 
 
 
  Export Promotion 
  Trade Finance 




  The Government has implemented a series of measures under a December 30 2008 law to support exporting 
companies, and includes measures such as providing 50% of insurance cost and improves cash flow for working 
capital, rescheduling debt payments for companies and support for rescheduling of credits for exporters. 
  The Government increased capital in COTUNACE (the quasi-government export credit and guarantee entity) by 6M 
dinars.  
  The Government has undertaken 11 “curative measures” that include providing state budget to promote domestic 
exports at trade fair and exhibits, assisting firms with working capital requirements and providing guidance and support 
to SMEs and new firms.   
  The Central Bank of Tunisia has lowered capital requirements in January 2009 to encourage more liquidity in the 
banking system, decreased the interest rate from 5.25 to 4.5% to reduce the cost of financing, increased the allocation 
of state budget for public projects, and established facilities for deposits and loans to meet bank liquidity needs.   
 
 
  Trade Finance 







  The Export-Import Bank of Turkey’s facilities have been expanded fromTL1.5Bn to TL2Bn, including an expansion of 
the scope of its export credit and insurance portfolios, increased its credit limit and value of insurance and guarantees, 
lowered its short-term TL-denominated export credit lending rate, increased export credit lending rate for USD-
denominated short-term export credits and extended the maturities of short-term export credits. 
  The Government has also initiated a new credit program, managed by the Export-Import Bank, to promote exporters in 
international trade fairs.  
  The Export-Import Bank and the Central Bank of Turkey implemented administrative changes to improve exporters’ 
access of the Central Bank’s discount facility. 
  The Central Bank’s discount limits have been increased from US$350M in 2008 to US$1Bn in Q1-2009. 
  Trade Finance 
 
Ukraine    The Parliament passed a "Draft Law on export insurance and crediting" in August 2008 that granted the Ukreximbank 
the status of official export credit agency.  This law is also in support of plans to establish the "Ukrainian Export 
Insurance Company”, a state insurance company. 

















The WBG supports the G-20 commitment from governments and multilateral institutions to 
provide US$250 billion in the coming years to bolster trade finance. In particular: 
- The Global Trade Finance Program (GTFP) has been doubled to US$3 billion over a three-
year period to provide additional guarantees to mitigate risks in trade transactions with local banks 
in emerging markets. 
- The Global Trade Liquidity Program (GTLP) is expected to contribute up to US$50 billion 
over a 3-year period to channel trade finance liquidity to developing countries.  
- The World Bank has also launched a US$40 million Trade Facilitation Facility (TFF) to 
support developing country priorities to improve trade facilitation systems, including 
infrastructure, institutions, services, procedures and regulatory systems. Developing countries need 
to continue to improve their trade competitiveness through trade facilitation and other behind-the-
border reforms to be competitive and to reap the benefits of the eventual global economic 
recovery.  World Bank Trade-Related Lending has more than doubled from US$1.4 billion in 
FY08 to US$3.4 billion in FY09, driven by projects in the Europe and Central Asia and Africa 
regions, in support of trade facilitation, regional integration, and export competitiveness.   
 
Support provided to surveyed countries 
 
Country Type  of  support 
India 
The World Bank has established a US$120 million line of credit for SMEs and a small 
guarantee fund. This project was scheduled to close in June 2009, but as a response to 
the crisis, the Bank recently negotiated additional financing of US$400 million to 
extend the original project by four years. 
Indonesia 
The World Bank is considering a US$200 million trade finance project that will: (1) 
recapitalize the Indonesian EXIM bank and provide a backstop facility to enhance 
underwriting capacity of the country's Export Insurance Agency; (2) set-up marketing 
schemes for emerging exporters and pre-shipment guarantees that will help diversify 
the export base and trade finance instruments.  Preparations for the project are 
estimated to start mid-2009.   In addition, the World Bank has approved a US$2 billion 
Public Expenditure Support Facility Development Policy Lending in March, 2009, 
which will help establish a re-discount window for trade finance through the Central 
Bank (Bank Indonesia) and create an Export Financing Agency. 
Kenya 
- The World Bank is preparing a US$65 million Regional Trade Facilitation Project 
that aims to strengthen the Africa Trade Insurance Agency (ATI) to facilitate the 
provision of insurance, including coinsurance and reinsurance, guarantees and other 
financial instruments and services for regional integration, trade, and investment.  As a 
member of ATI, Kenya will benefit from this project.  
- The IFC’s Global Trade Finance Facility offers lines of credit to Kenyan banks (6 
issuing banks currently used this facility and is exploring possibilities of providing 40 
 
more confirming lines to new Kenyan banks).   
Sierra Leone 
 The IFC has provided US$1 million of LC confirmation lines to two largest local 
banks and these lines are fully utilized; the banks are requesting the IFC to increase 
this to US$3 million. 
Turkey 
The World Bank is implementing a US$300 million loan with Turkish Exim bank and 
another US$300 million loan with the local development bank (TSKB) to finance 
working capital and investment for exporters. The Bank also implemented a US$200 
million SME credit line, including for exporters’ working capital or trade finance, and 
an additional SME credit line of US$500 million is confirmed for FY10. 
Tunisia 
The World Bank is supporting a US$40 million Export Development Project that 
includes: (1) the Export Market Access Fund, a matching grant program that provides 
co-financing to firms, and (2) a Pre-shipment Export Finance Guarantees Facility.  
Ukraine 
The World Bank is implementing a US$150 million export development project with 
Ukraine Eximbank (Ukrexim) and discussion are underway with Ukrexim bank for a 
follow-up Export Development project later in 2009.  Additionally, a US$250 million 
Export Development 3 or EDP2 AF to augment financing support for exporters has 
also been confirmed for FY10 (starting in July 2009).  
IFC’s Global Trade Finance Program (GTFP) was launched in Ukraine in October 
2005, and increased its program by US$500 million to US$1.5 billion in October 2008 
and to US$3 billion in December 2008. 
Source: World Bank and consultants’ survey reports 
 